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No. 82-708
Cert to Calif. s. Ct. (Mosk, Bird, Newman,
Broussard; Richa~dson, Kaus diisentirig)

SUMMA CORP. ,

"/v.

(J"-

L.A.

CALIFORNIA, etc., et al.

1.

SUMMARY:

State/Civil

Did the California

s.

Timely (with ext.)
Ct err in imposing a

"public trust" on property derived from a federally-patented
Mexican land grant?
.--,

2.

7

FACTS & DECISION BELOW:

In 1839, while California was

still part of Mexico, the local governor of the province granted

CV~G - bee~~ "l~ ~"~ wJJ.. ~ ~~~
~ ..~-~-~ s~'s.. ~ ~ ~ ~ 1c.&.-. ~~ ~aaii,

•

-

a seaside

rty known as Rancho Ballena to the Machados and

.

...

Rancho Ballena, known today as the Ballena
Lagoo,!!_, is an arm of the Pacific Ocean in the Marina del Rey area
of Los Angeles.

It is currently tidelands; at high tide it is

covered by from one to six feet of water.
virtually ~ Y•

At low tide it is

~

Petr owns a parcel of land in what formerly w a s ~

Rancho Ballena.

(~

~ ~~

In 1848 California w_a s ceded to the United States. -1 The

~•)
q&r~
Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty of that yea iforovided that the rights of
Mexican citizens in their property were tq be "inviolably
,

respected."

In order to fufill this treaty obligation, Congress

enacted in 1851 "An Act to ascertain and settle the private Land
Claims in the State of California", 9 Stat. 631 (The Act of
1851).

This act established a Board of Land Commissioners to

hear claims to property by Mexican citizens and issue federal
patents for valid claims.
The Machados and Talamantes

who had received Rancho

Ballena from the Mexican government -- petitioned the Board of
Land Commissioners for a patent confirming their title to the
property.

Although the Board confirmed the claim and a federal

DC upheld the confirmation, difficulties developed during the
subsequent survey to fix the precise boundaries of the property.
Among other things, it appears that it was claimed that the
Ranchos Ballena consisted in part of tidelands, and that such
proper~y was not patentable.

This issue was referred to the

General Land Office Commissioner, who decided, on the basis of
'----

three affidavits, that the land in question was not tidelands.

A
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patent was issued for the entire claim.

At an unidentified time

afterwards a portion of the claim was conveyed to petr in fee.
In the early 1970's the city of Los Angeles determined to
dredge the Ballena Lagoon.

In order to avoid the expense of a

condemnation proceeding, it filed an action in state court to
quiet title against owners of property in the area, including
petr, claiming that it possessed various types of easements to
the property that permitred such dredging.

-

(The city eventually

changed its mind about dredging, and instead determined that the
,

~

property should remain undeveloped and open to the public
which petr apparently resisted.) The state of California, named
as a defendant, claimed that it had acquired an interest in the
property upon admission to the Union, that this interest

C-e:,~£-s

permitted it to put the property to public use without payment of ~
compensation, and that it had given this interest to the city.
It relied on a line of California cases establishing the
trust" ....doctrine
which provides that the state holds an interest
~,,,...,
in tidelands that allows it to use the properties "for purposes
such as commerce, navigation, and fishing, as well as for
environmental and recreational purposes."

Petn App. at Al.

The <c agreed with the state, holding that the city could
dredge the 17
domain.

n without exercising its powers of eminent

The California Court of Appeal reversed, and the

citiJppealed to the California

s.

Ct, which upheld the TC's

-

---

decision on the grounds that the state retained a "public trust"
interest in the lands.

---------

- 4 -

a:>

The S. Ct first held that the land in question
constituted tidelands, relying upon apparently uncontroverted
testimony of "[e]xperts in the field of geology and
geomorphology."

-

This finding was critical to the determination

that the "public trust" doctrine was applicable to petr's
property, since California law extend~
tidelands.

e doctrine only to

Next, the court found that the Guadalupe Hidalgo

Treaty, the Act of 1851, and the federal land patent did not
destroy California's "public trust" interest in the lands.
The court reasoned that the first owners of the property
in question

the Machados and Talamantes -- had taken title

subject to the Mexican government's "public trust" rights.

s.
-

The

Ct relied on the testimony of experts in 19th century Mexican

law for this conclusion.

Next, the court decided that when the

United States annexed California it acquired Mexico's public
trust interest.

Recognizing that there "is little authority

regarding this issue," the court determined that since the Act of
1851 gave the US fee interests in unpatented land, there was no
reason it should not also give lesser interests, such as a
"public trust" interest.
Finally, the California S. Ct decided that the issuance
of the federal land patent for Rancho Ballona in fee did not
affect the stat~•s "pub1ic trust" interest.
that numerous

.
decisions

The court recognized

by this Court established that a federal

land patent conclusively determined that the grantee possesses
title to the land described within and that this interest
!
prevailed
over later claims of ownership by private parties or

-

5 -

the government, citing Knight v. US Land Ass'n, 142 US 161, 184
(1891); San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138

us

656, 670-71 (1891); US v.

Coronado Beach Co., 255 US 472, 487-88 (1921).

These cases were

distinguished by the California court on the ground that they
involved only claims to title and ownership, not to "public
trust" interests in property owned by others.
The court distinguished

us

v. Title Insurance Co., 265

us

472 (1924), where the Court held that Indians who retained a
perpetual right to occupy certain lands under Mexican law did not
retain that right in lands patented by private parties under the
Act of 1851, because the right had not been asserted in the
proceedings under the Act.

The California court said: "We do not

find this case to be convincing authority.

The right to occupy

land is normal incident of title, and we have no quarrel with the
proposition that private persons who failed to assert their right
to occupancy in the patent proceedings may not thereafter claim
that right.

But the right to exclude the public from tidelands

is not a normal incident of title.

To the contrary, as we have

seen, conveyance of such lands by the government does not
ordinarily free them from the burden of the public trust even
though no reservation is made in the deed for the preservation of
the people's interest."

Petn App., at Al5.

In summary, the

California court held that petr's predecessors had tak ~n title
\,.,.,,

~

~

---

•

from Mexico subject to a "public trust," that California
succeeded to this interest when it entered the Union, and that
the state's failure to claim this interest in patent proceedings
'----"

undeL the Act of 1851 did not affect the interest.

-

3.

CONTENTIONS:

6 -

(1)

Petr.

The California S. Ct

correctly recognized that ownership of tidelands that were
granted by the Mexican government to private citizens did not
pass to California upon its admission to the Union.
Coronado Beach Co., 255

us

472, 487-88 (1921).

See US v.

The lower court,

however, engaged in a semantic sleight of hand by creating a
"public trust" interest retained by the state.

Under California

I

law a "public trust" interest leaves the owner of property with
onl

"naked title to the soil," People v. California Fish Co.,

166 Cal. 576, 598 (1913), and permits the state to make virtually
any use it chooses of the land.

-

For example, it may construct a

YMCA, People v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal.2d 875 (1959), or

d rill for oil, Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148 (1928).
California's failure to present its claim in the patent
proceedings under the Act of 1851 precludes assertion of a
"public trust" interest now.

1~

In Barker v. Harvey, 181 US 481

(1901), Indians who possessed a right of occupancy under Mexican
law, sought to assert that right in federal court.

This Court

held that the right was abandoned when not asserted in federal
patent proceedings under the 1851 Act: "Surely a claimant would
have little reason for presenting to the land commission his
claim to land, and securing a confirmation of that claim, if the
only result was to transfer the naked fee to him burdened by an
Indian right of permanent occupancy."
Title Insurance Co., 265

us

Id., at 491-92.

In US v.

472 (1924), the Court adhered to

Barker, saying that the "purpose of the Act of 1851 was to give
repos~ to titles as well as to fulfill treaty obligations, and

- 7 f

that it not only permitted but required all claims to be
presented to the commission, and barred all from future assertion
which were not presented within the two years."

M.•, at 483.

Since the "public trust" interest claimed by California is at
least as broad as that asserted by the Indians in Barker and
Title Insurance Co., the lower court's attempt to distinguish the
cases fails.
(2)

Under state law, only tidelands are subject to a

"public trust" interest.

Relying on expert testimony the

California courts decided that petr's property constituted
tidelands.

This was error because in 1873 the General Land

Office determined that the property was not tidelands, and
because "if there is any one thing respecting the administration
of the public lands which must be considered as settled by
repeated adjudications of this court, it is that the decision of
the land department upon mere ~ estions of fact is ... conclusive,
4

and such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the
courts."

Johnson v. Drew, 171 US 93, 99 (1898).

The lower court

decided that the General Land Office's determination as to
whether Rancho Ballena was tidelands was ambiguous because the
Office denominated the lagoon as an "inner bay," which, according
to the 1951 edition of Webster's, meant tidelands; this is wrong.
The Office decided that the lagoon was "not an arm of the sea"
and this plainly resolves the question of whether the lagoon
constituted tidelands.
Resp •
.._____,.

(1)

Under California law title to tidal lands is

subject to a "public trust" easement, even when the patent

-

8 -

conveying fee title to the land does not contain an explicit
reservation of the interest.

The grant of Rancho Ballona from

the Mexican government to the Machados and Talamantes provided
that "they may enclose it without prejudice to the traversing
roads and servitudes •••• "

This was incorporated by reference

into both the Board of Land Commissioner's confirmation decree
and a decision of the federal DC upholding the decree.

Expert

witnesses testified that this phrase reserved a "public trust"
interest under Mexican law.

See also Apalachicola Land

&

Development co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393 (1923).
The question of whether the foregoing clause reserved in the
Mexican government a "public trust" interest is not a federal
question.

This Court has established that a dispute as to the

nature and extent of property rights gained under patents issued
by the United States in confirmation of prior Mexican grants does
not present a federal question.

Los Angeles Milling Co. v. Los

Angeles, 217 US 217; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 US 313 (1906);
Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188

us

314 (1903).

Petr's claim that California abandoned its "public trust"
interest by not asserting it in federal patent proceedings is
without merit.

The Board of Land Commissioners lacked

jurisdiction to determine the validity of private land grants
________
.....,____,.._

made by prior sovereigns.

=----",,..___ _ _ _ _ __

The Board had authority only to

determine the validity of fee simple interests.

us,

In Fremont v.

58 US 541 (1854), this Court held that the Board lacked

jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims to mineral
'-----

rights.

Petr's reliance on Barker v. Harvey, 181 US 481 (1901),

-

is misplaced.

9 -

That case involved the private claims of Mission

Indians and the Act of 1851 was intended to "ascertain and settle
private claims."

As to public rights, however, there could have

been no abandonment, Eldridge v Trezevant, 160 US 452 (1896); New
Orleans v.

us,

35 US 662 (1836).

(2) Petr's argument that the General Land Office decision
that Rancho Ballona was not tidelands does not present a federal
question.

In addition, as the California

s.

Ct held, the

Office's decision was ambiguous, and thus has no preclusive
effect.
Amicus.

✓

The California Land Title Association, acting on

behalf of a number of title insurance companies, urges the Court
to review the decision below.

Thousands of policies insuring

titles within Mexican land grants patented under the Act of 1851
have been issued.

These policies did not take into account the

risk that the lands would be declared subject to "public trust"
interests.

Over 8,500,000 acres of California land derives from

u/d}.J'

federally-patented Mexican grants,- which generally included
shallow lagoons, sloughs, ·streams, and ponds -- much of which may
be tidelands for purposes of the public trust doctrine.

The

United States owns a substantial amount of property obtained from
private parties, which is subject to a "public trust" interest.
The decision below, if allowed to stand, will cloud title to vast

-

amounts of California, and foreclose title insurance for similar
areas.

Moreover, under the law of Mexico "fountains," "the sandy ,

beaches on the banks of rivers," "the commons and roads trave_rsed

- 10 -

by horses," "mountains," and "pastures" are subject to a public
trust, and California could claim rights to such property.
A federally-patented, Mexican land grant is good against
both private parties and the government.
US 478, 492 (1866)

See Beard v. Federy, 70

("As against the government this record [a

federal patent], so long as it remains unvacated, is
conclusive.").

Amicus also repeats petr's argument that a

reexamination of factual question decided by the General Lands
Office is improper.
4. DISCUSSION:

The decision below appears important

because of the co~siderable amount of,,,12rOBerty in southern
California that derived from)federally-patented Mexican land

---

...,

grants and because of the sweeping character of a "public trust"
interest.

The question of what property interests petr and the

state received as a result of the Act of 1851 patent proceedings
seems clearly to be a question of federal law.
v. Corvallis Sand

&

State Land Board

Gravel Co., 429 US 363, 375 (1977); Knight v.

United States Land Association, 142 US 161, 183-84 (1891).
On the merits, the case is difficult.

The California

s.

Ct's treatment of the effect of the failure of the state to
assert its "public trust" claim in the Act of 1851 patent
proceedings is somewhat inconsistent with this Court's decisions
in the area.

In US v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 US 472, 487-88

(1921), the Court indicated in dicta that California's title to
certain tidal lands was subject to prior Mexican grants that had
been federally patented.
--..__,/

Similar results were reached in US v.

Title•Insurance & Trust Co., 265 US 472 (1924), and Barker v.

- 11 Heavey, 181 US 481 (1901), in cases where Indians sought to claim
rights to occupancy that had been long recognized but not
asseited in patent proceedings under the Act of 1851.

-

The distinctions offered by the lower court and resp are

not completely persuasive.

The California S. Ct relied on the

f act that occupancy is a "normal incident of title" and thus the
Indians in Barker and Title Insurance & Trust were required to
have claimed this type of right in federal patent proceedings.

A

"public trust" interest, however, is at least as significant and
intrusive an interest as a right to occupancy, and the California
court's distinction is thus not particularly strong.

Resp also

draws a distinction between public and private claims.

This

seems foreclosed, however, by US v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 US
472, 487-88 (1921), which indicated that California was bound to
present its claims to the patent commission under the Act of
1851.

See also Beard v. Federy, 70 US 478, 490 (1866).

Resp

also argues that Townsend v. Greeley, 72 US 326, 335 (1866) (no
obligation to assert equitable interests in Act of 1851 patent
proceedings), made it unnecessary for the state to assert its
public trust interest in the patent proceedings.

This decision

seems to provide the best basis for distinguishing this case from
the Barker, Title Insurance & Trust Co., and Coronado Beach Co.,
decisions, since the interest asserted by the state seems to be
some sort of trust interest.

Nonetheless, Townsend did not

involve the peculiar "public trust" interest presented here and
it is unclear to me whether that decision should apply to this
...___,,.

type of interest: Townsend apparently did not apply in the Indian

? ?

- 12 occupancy cases which involve interests similar to the )
trust" interest.

-

blic

In summary, the governing precedents are

------ ------

unclear, particularly as applied to the novel "public trust"
i nterest.

To the extent I understand them, I think these

precedents are somewhat inconsistent with the decision below.
Because of the widespread economic significance of the case, the
Court should give serious consideration to a grant.

-

(The SG' s
..-:::

- -

views might also be upeful, given the extensive federal land

'--holdings
that might be affected.)
I do not recommend reviewing the second question raised by
petr.

The question turns on a factual determination of what was

meant by a particular land grant in 1873 and involves no
principles of general significance.
There is a response and one amicus brief.

December 28, 1982
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

Summa Corp. v. California
No. 82-708

February 26, 1984

David A. Charny
Question Presented

Whether a United States patent, issued to confirm title
to land granted to private owners by the Mexican government, reserved to California a "public trust" interest in tidelands in- - - -- - - - - - -

eluded within the patent.

- - ------···-·· · - - - -

··-·

-~_ _ . l i t

bench memo: Summa \. ,:p. v. California
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I. Background
Under the California "public trust" doctrine, the state
holds a trust interest on behalf of the public in tidelands.
Private persons hold these lands subject to the eublic's right
use the lands for commerce, navigation and recreation.
The present suit involves the applicability of the doctrine to the Ballena Lagoon, now an arm of the Pacific Ocean.

-4,-/ (

The lagoon lies within a tract of land granted by the Mexican
government to private individuals in 1839.

After the United -

States acquired California, the owners of the land filed their
claim to it with the Board of Land Commissioners.

Congress had

created the Board to confirm the claims of Mexican citizens to
California land, as the United States had agreed in the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo to respect Mexican property rights in the territories acquired from Mexico.

- -

The Board approved the claim, and the District Court

-

affirmed.

------

A survey of the confirmed claim was then approved by

the Surveyor General and submitted to the General Land Office,
that was responsible for issuing patents.

The Office in 1873

-

issued a patent that included the lagoon within the bounds of

~-------------- -----

property, although the parties now dispute whether the patent
~

unambiguously includes a determination of the character of the
Lagoon -- whether it was an "arm of the sea" or merely a nontidal, inland pond.
The present suit arose when resp Los Angeles invoked the
doctrine to make various "improvements" in the lagoon.

The City

filed a quiet title action against petr, and other owners of the

bench memo: Summa (

- p.

v. California

page 4.

lagoon, alleging that it owned a "public trust" easement in the
lagoon.

The State, a necessary party under California and a resp

here, supported the City's claim.

The TC determined that the

City did have an easement and that, in any case, the defendants
had dedicated the property to public use.
The California S.Ct. affirmed, reaching only the TC's
holding on the public trust doctrin-e.

Accepting that the patent

-

was a final determination of rights to the property, the state
court found the patent ambiguous as to whether the lagoon was
tidelands.

It found that other evidence admitted before the TC
......._
-···--· \', The state court then
demonstrated that the 'i agoon was tidelands.
found, citing the testimony at trial of an expert on Mexican law,
that petr's predecessors in interest had been granted the property subject to the public's rights in the tidelands.

The reserved

interest was acquired by the TTnited States when it annexed the
territory, and then passed to California when it became a state.
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction and Mexican Law Questions
Resps' contention that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction is without merit.

The cited cases involved property

rights conceded to have been incorporated from Mexican law into
the federal patents.

E.g., Los Angeles Milling Co. v. Los Ange-

les, 217 U.S. 217, 226 (1910).

The Court held the scope of these

rights was a question of state law.

In contrast, the present

•

case require? the Court to consider whether the federal patents
ins..or:e_ora te 1:.!le "public trust" easement that arguably would obta in under Mexican law.

-------

bench memo: Summa

-

:p. v. California
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The SG further urges the Court to reach the issue whether Mexican law would have recognized the "public trust" easement,
arguing ~

the line of cases culminating in Los Angeles Milling

Co. was overruled by United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 217-218
(1942).

The Pink case reviewed, although with some degree of

deference, a New York court's determination of Russian property
law that governed the scope of the Litvinov Agreement, under
which the United States acquired various extraterritorial properties that had been expropriated by the Soviet government.

This

case is slender authority for overruling Los Angeles Milling Co.
Pink posed foreign law issues of importance to the property and
foreign relations interests of the United States: no state policy
was at stake.

In Los Angeles Milling Co. -- a case that, like

the present one, involved the water rights of Los Angeles -- the
state interests in the foreign law issue were great, as the Mexican law would become the state common law of property for much of
California and would determine the rights of a state
intrumentality: and no federal interest was directly implicated.
The SG's position would give the federal courts jurisdiction over
a number of ordinary property disputes.
Although the Court undoubtedly has the power to deter/

\, I

mine that the ~ alifornia courts' determination of Mexican law is
so erroneous as to threaten the integrity of the patent rights

----------------------------

confirmed by the United States, neither the record nor the SG's
brief seems to support this determination.

bench memo:

~

v. California

page 6.

B. Reservation of the Public Trust
Although it is a close question, it does not appear that
the failure of California to assert its public trust claim forfeited that claim.

-

~

¾-overning principle appears to be that the

---

------ -----·
(\

6-

government reserves such rights to lands granted by it "as may

Cf,N'-1-

appear on the face of the grant, or the law under which it was
~

made, or be declared by a general statute in force at the time
the interest of grantee was acquired."
208 F. 611 (1913).

I

~

u

United States v. Rindge,

~
~Ith

Although the reservation of the public trust

is not explicit in the grant, the law under which the grant was

,h,~d4t

made by Mexico and confirmed by the United States appears to have
\J\

I (

contemplated such a reservation.

The public trust in tidelands

is not, under Mexican law, a right that would attach only to
lands as a consequence of the terms of a deed by the government.
Rather, the record indicates that the public trust attaches to
I

I

•

\.\

,

,

j

all tidelands simply as a consequence of their geological condi-

--

tion.

See JA, at 221-222.

As the state under Mexican law could

not grant these lands to private individuals, a grant of lands

y?~
..l_ _

.J..-

TYl-',-4;1

~
H~

whose boundaries included tidelands need not contain an explici~

~e:.---reservation of the public trust in order to preserve that right.
For this reasons, the claim does not appear to be the type th~
Congress intended to have asserted in these proceedings.
gress's primary concern appears to have been to resolve

~
claim? ~of:;7,.,,.,
Con H

property that rested upon particular grants or reservations ~ ~
title by the Mexican government.

~

In this respect, the public trust in tidelands would
differ from those public rights in particular easements, such as

-

bench memo:

~

page 7.
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roadways, that the state may have preserved by general saving
language in a deed.

Easements usually arise not from the geolog-

ical features of the land itself but from a particular claim of
right; further, the state had the power to extinguish the easement or grant it to private persons.

Such easements, like fee

,'·

·'

claims to land by the state, could only be proven against contrary private claims by particular deeds, and would have to have
been substantiated before the Board of Land Commissioners.

THe

public trust in tidelands is clearly different.
Although no case directly establishes this point, this
',·

appears most consistent with the pattern of decision in analogous
property cases.

The Court has recognized that decisions of the

Board of Land Commissioners finally disposed of sovereign claims
with respect to fee interests to particular properties, e.g.
United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921), and
lesser rights, including easements and mineral rights, asserted
as to particular lands or on the basis of particular grants,
either by private parties, e.g., Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481
(1901); United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. 17, 166 (1862).

In

contrast, rights such as easements of access to navigable waters
attach without express reservation by the patent.

E.g. New Or-

leans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836); Eldridge v.
Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the resps' posi1(

~

tion is the sweeping possessory interest

a ~

acquire over the land under the public trust doctrine.

ld
It ap-

pears that under the public trust doctrine the owner of tidelands

•'

bench memo: Summa
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exercises his possessory interest only at the pleasure of the
state.

But that is true as well of other navigational servitude

or easements, within the scope of the easement, and so does not
distinguish the present case.

Nor does petr argue that Califor-

nia has extended the public trust doctrine beyond what would reasonably have been reserved by Mexico at the time of the original
grant, and there is no evidence in the record to support that
argument.
C. Equal Footing Doctrine
Although the SG correctly argues that the Court has never held that a public trust easement passed to states under the

__________

....,.....,.
Equal Footing Doctrine,
a contrary holding would be inconsistent

with the principles underlying the Doctrine.

There is no reason

to distinguish the "public trust" easement from other property
rights, including both ownership in fee and lesser proerty interests, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453
(1892), that pass to the states under the Doctrine.

As the SG

acknowledges, the navigational servitude did not pass to the
state under the Doctrine because it is an attribute of the police
power rather than a proprietary right.
D. Estoppel Effect of the Board's Determination
Although the federal patent conclusively resolves any
question of title, it appears that the federal patent at issue
here does not consider the question whether the lagoon was tide-

•

land.- 4he General Land Office was concerned whether the outer
_,,,---

boundary of the patented land was the shore of the lagoon or the
ocean.

The Office noted that on the "diseno" that was part of
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the Mexican grant, no bay was indicated; it reasoned that it was
unlikely that the grant would be silent as to so prominent feature of the land and so returned the survey for confirmation of
the survey.

JA, at 33.

The ex parte affidavits filed with the Land Office upon
subsequent proceedings indicate that the lagoon was not tidal.
This conclusion was adopted by the Surveyor-General in his report

~

to the Secretary of the Interior.

JA, at 92-93.

And the map

attached to the patent deleted an earlier reference to an
"inlet."

N~

ss, petr's reliance upon the patent as conclu-

sive evidence that there is no public trust impressed upon its
property is not without difficulty.

The decision of the Secre-

tary finds the weight of the evidence cited by the SurveyorGeneral "establishes the correctness of the survey
location of the northern (or northwestern)

in its

line of the Ballena

[property] according to the decree of confirmation [that] establishes the boundary in question

II

JA, at 100.

The Secretary

apparently did not consider the question of the character of the
lagoon, that was irrelevant to the location of the northern
boundary.

As the Surveyor-General and the Secretary determined

around this time not to permit proof by ex parte affidavits, it
seems questionable whether the finding that the lagoon was not an
inlet, if necessary to the decision, would have been affirmed.
Further, the patent itself incorporates the field notes of the

•

original , survey, that petr concedes to have considered the lagoon
to be an arm of the sea.

JA, at 103.

The terms of the patent

itself contain nothing that would contradict these notes.

t
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It thus does not appear that the patent definitively
resolves the question whether the lagoon is an arm of the sea.
The patent itself supports contradictory inferences; and the only
other reference to the question in the proceedings that led to
the issuance of the patent is a report of testimony upon which
the Department itself would not have relied in issuing a patent.
And resolution of the tidelands issue was not necessary to any of
the points contested by the rival claimants or questioned by the
Land Office in requesting a second survey.

To the contrary, the

rou hly contemporaneous U.S. Coast Survey refers to the lagoon as

---

an "estuary," and the evidence in the record unequivocally indi~

- ----------------· - -- -

cates that the lagoon was tidal.
III. Conclusion
With some hesitation, I conclude that the state court's
decision should be affirmed.

It appears that the public trust is

i( .
\,\
.
.
b est understood as attaching to tidelands even in the absence of

....

an express reservation by the grant of title; and that in issuing
the patent to the property in question here, the government made

--

no determination that the lagoo"n was not tidelands.

Although

California'~ exten~iori ~f the public trust doctrine may raise
constitutional questions, those questions are not before the

-------------

Court in this case.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Summa Corp. v. California, No.~

--

The State has filed a brief in opposition to the memorandum for
the U.S.

It argues that the SG admits that the lands in question
I/

,,

were and are tidelands and that, under the laws of Mexico in effect
at the time of the Mexican conveyance to petr's predecessors in

-

-

interest, tidelands were subj ect to a "public trust easement."

::::::::::::::

:::::

.

Indeed, the original Mexican grant contains a specific, express
reservation of such public rights, and this reservation was
incorporated by reference into the U.S.'s Decree of Confirmation.
Even if there were no such reservation, the Court in Fremont v.
United States, 58 U.S. 541 (1854), decided that "trust" interests
are not affected by proceedings to confirm private titles conveyed
by prior sovereigns upon cession to the U.S.
,

Cal. recognizes the
I{

'- \

underlying fee title of petr, but claims only one incident of

7

ownership.

Indeed, the federal government itself recognized that
---the public trust servitude exists over tidelands within ranchos.

See United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 482 (1921)
(SG's arguments).

The incidents stemming from private ownership of

property have traditionally been defined according to state law and
this Court has consistently held that no federal question is >fpresented as to such matters.

Finally, no interest of the U.S. is

<
I,

,'

.•.

affected by this case in that it holds a similar title interest in
the subject tidelands which is paramount to that of Calif.
The City of L.A. has also submitted a brief in opposition to

~·

the petn for cert.
I think this is a very complicated case, a
unsure of my grasp of all the issues.

am somewhat

I am 'nclined, however, to

believe that there is a substantial issue whether there is a federal
question presented by the case.

1

The importance of this case even in

Cal. is doubtful, because it only j f fects tioelands and a non-title
i~

that.

------

k /.l t this ~imi ao ==no:= t ; nk .. it is : n appropriate
/rt,
.A,

case for this Court's review.

March 18, 1983

.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-708

SUMMA CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA EX REL. STATE LANDS COMMISSION
AND CITY OF LOS ANGELES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF CALIFORNIA
[April - , 1984]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner owns the fee title to property known as the
Ballona Lagoon, a narrow body of water connected to Marina
del Rey, a man-made harbor located in a part of the City of
Los Angeles called Venice. Venice is located on the Pacific
Ocean between the Los Angeles International Airport and
the City of Santa Monica. The present case arises from a
lawsuit brought by respondent City of Los Angeles against
petitioner Summa Corp. in state court, in which the City alleged that it held an easement in the Ballona Lagoon for commerce, navigation, and fishing, for the passage of fresh waters to the Venice Canals, and for water recreation. The
State of California, joined as a defendant as required by state
law, filed a cross-complaint alleging that it had acquired an
interest in the lagoon for commerce, navigation, and fishing
upon its admission to the Union, that it held this interest in
trust for the public, and that it had granted this interest to
the City of Los Angeles. The City's complaint indicated that
it wanted to dredge the lagoon and make other improvements
without having to exercise its power of eminent domain over
p~titioner's property. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents, finding that the lagoon was subject to the public
trust easement claimed by the City and the State, who had
the right to construct improvements in the lagoon without
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exercising the power of eminent domain or compensating the
landowners. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288 (1982).
In the Supreme Court of California, petitioner asserted
that the Ballona Lagoon had never been tideland, that-even if
it had been tideland, Mexican law imposed no servitude on
the fee interest by reason of that fact, and that even if it were
tideland and subject to a servitude under Mexican law, such a
servitude was forfeited by the failure of the State to assert it
in the federal patent proceedings. The Supreme Court of
California ruled against petitioner on all three of these
grounds. We now reverse that judgment, holding that even
if it is assumed thattheBaHona Lagoon was art of tidelanas
su ~ec y ex1can a!Y, o the serv1tu e described bDh,.e Supreme Court of California, the 'State's clainfto such a servitude mu
ave een resented in the federal patent proceeding in order o survive the issue of a fee patent. 1
1
Respondents argue that the decision below presents simply a question
concerning an incident of title, which even though relating to a patent issued under a federal statute raises only a question of state law. They rely
on cases such as Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U. S. 314 (1903), Los Angeles
Milling Co. v. Los Angeles, 217 U. S. 217 (1910), and Boquillas Land &
Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U. S. 339 (1909). These cases all held, quite
properly in our view, that questions of riparian water rights under patents
issued under the 1851 Act did not raise a substantial federal question
merely because the conflicting claims were based upon such patents. But
the co~rov~~ in_~e r,r~se, unlike those cases, turns on the proper
construclionof meAcfofMarch 3, 1851. Were the rule otherwise, this
Courts dec1s10n in arker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481 (1901), would have
been to dismiss the appeal, which was the course taken in Hooker, rather
than to decide the case on the merits. See also Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall.
478 (1866). The opinion below clearly recognized as much, for the California Supreme Court wrote, "under the Act of 1851, the federal government
succeeded to Mexico's right in the tidelands granted to the defendants'
predecessors upon annexation of California," 31 Cal. 3d at 298, an interest
that "was acquired by California upon its admission to statehood," id., at
302. Thus, our jurisdiction is based on the need to determine whether the
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Petitioner's title to the lagoon, like all the land in Marina
del Ray, dates back to 1839, when the Mexican Governor of
California granted to Augustin and Ignacio Machado and
Felipe and Tomas Talamantes a property known as the Rancho Ballona. 2 The land comprising the Rancho Ballona beprovisions of the 1851 Act operate to preclude California from now asserting its public trust easement.
The 1839 grant to the Machados and Talamantes contained a reservation
that the grantees may enclose the property "without prejudice to the traversing roads and servitudes [servidumbres]." App. 5. According to expert testimony at trial, under Las Siete Partidas, the law in effect at the
time of the Mexican grant, this reservation in the Machados' and
Talamantes' grant was intended to preserve the rights of the public in the
tidelands enclosed by the boundaries of the Rancho Ballona. The California Supreme Court reasoned that this interest was similar to the common
law public trust imposed on tidelands. Petitioner and amicus United
States argue, however, that this reservation was never intended to create
a public trust easement of the magnitude now asserted by California. At
most this reservation was inserted in the Mexican grant simply to preserve
existing roads and paths for use by the public. See United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S. 472, 485-486 (1921); Barker v. Harvey, 181
U. S. 472 (1901); cf. Jover v. Insular Government, 221 U. S. 623 (1911).
While it is beyond cavil that we may take a fresh look at what Mexican law
may have been in 1839, see United States v. Perot, 98 U. S. 428, 430 (1878);
Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 541, 556 (1854), we find it unnecessary
to determine whether Mexican law imposed such an expansive easement on
grants of private property.
2
The Rancho Ballona occupied an area of approximately 14,000 acres
and included a tidelands area of about 2,000 acres within its boundaries.
The present-day Ballona Lagoon is virtually all that remains of the former
tidelands, with fillinganddevelopment or natural conditions transforming
most of much larger lagoon area into dry land. Although Respondent Los
Angeles claims that the present controversy involves only what remains of
the old lagoon, a fair reading of California law suggests that the State's
claimed public trust servitude can be extended over land no longer subject
to the tides if the land was tidelands when California became a state. See
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462 (1970).
The Mexican grantees acquired-title through a formal process that began
with a petition to the Mexican Governor of California. Their petition was
forwarded to the City Council of Los Angeles, whose committee on vacant
lands approved the request. Formal vesting of title took place after the

\
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came part of the United States following the war between the
United States and Mexico, which was formally ended by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. 9 Stat. 922. Under
the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo the United
States undertook to protect the property rights of Mexican
l a n ~ ua a upe i a go,
I, Stat.
929, at t e same time settlers were moving into California in
large numbers to exploit the mineral wealth and other resources of the new territory. Mexican grants encompassed
well over 10,000,000 acres in California and included some of
the best land suitable· for development. H. R. Rep. No. 1,
33d Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1854). As we
......, wrote long ago:
"The country was new, and rich in mineral wealth, and
attracted settlers, whose industry and enterprise produced an unparalleled state of prosperity. The enhanced value given to the whole surface of the country
by the discovery of gold, made it necessary to ascertain
and settle all private land claims, so that the real estate
belonging to individuals could be separated from the
public domain." Peralta v. United States, 3 Wall. 434,
439 (1_§_§5); see also Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S.
238, 244 (1889).
To fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and to provide for an orderly settlement of Mexican
land claims, Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1851, setting up a comprehensive claims settlement procedure.
Under the terms o e Act, a Board o I;an
omm1ss1oners
was ·established with the power to decide the rights of "each
and every person claiming lands in California by virtue of any
right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government .... " Act of March 3, 1851, § 8, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631, 632.
The Board was to decide the validity of any claim according
Rancho had been inspected, a Mexican judge had completed "walking the
boundaries," App. 213, and the conveyance duly registered. See generally App. 1-13; United States v. Pico, 5 Wall. 536, 539 (1866).
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to "the laws, usages, and customs" of Mexico, id., at § 11,
while parties before the Board had the right to appeal to the
District Court for a de novo determination of their rights, id.,
at§ 9; Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. 363, 375 (1867), and to appeal to this Court, id., at § 10. Claimants were required to
present their claims within two years, however, or have their
claims barred. Id., at § 13, see Botiller v. Dominguez, 130
U. S: 238 (1889). The final decree of the Board, or any patent issued under the Act, was also a conclusive adjudication
of the rights of the claimant as against the United States, but
not against the interests of third parties with superior titles.
Act of March 3, 1851, § 15.
In 1852 the Machados and the Talamantes petitioned the
Boa:rclfor confirmation of their title under the Act. Following a hearing, the petition was gran e ~ o a r d , App.
21, and affirmed by the United States District Court on appeal, App. 22-23. Before a patent could issue, however, a
survey of the property had to be approved by the Surveyor
General of California. The survey for this purpose was completed in 1858, and although it was approved by the Surveyor
General of California, it was rejected upon submission to the
General Land Office of the Department of Interior. App.
32-34.
In the confirmation proceedings that followed, the proposed survey was readvertised and interes
a:rfies informe o t eir ·
o pa 1cipate in the proceedings. 3 The
3
It is undisputed that the State had the right to participate in the patent proceedings leading to confirmation of the Machados' and Talamantes'
grant. The State asserts that as a "practice" it did not participate in confirmation proceedings under the 1851 Act. Brief of Respondent California
16, n. 17. In point of fact, however, the State participated in just such a
proceeding involving a rancho near the Rancho Ballona. See National Archives, RG 49, California Land Claims, Docket 414. Moreover, before the
Mexican grant was confirmed, Congress passed a statute ~pecially conferring a right on all parties claiming an interest in any tract embraced by a
published survey to file objections to the survey. Act of July 1, 1864, § 1,
ch. 194, 13 Stat. 332.
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property owners immediately north of the Rancho Ballona
protested the proposed survey of Rancho Ballona; the Machados and Talamantes, the original grantees, filed affidavits in
support of their claim. As a result of these submissions, as
well as a consideration of the surveyor's field notes and un- j
derlying Mexican documents, the General Land Office withdrew its objection to the proposed ocean boundary. The
Secretary of the Interior subsequently approved the survey
and in 1873 a patent was issued confirming title in the Rancho
Ballona to the original Mexican grantees. App. 101-109.
Significantly, the federal patent issued to the Machados and
Talamantes made no mention of any public trust interest such
as the one asserted by California in the present proceedings.
The public trust easement claimed by California in this }
lawsuit has been interpreted to apply to all lands which were
tidelands at the time California became a state, irrespective
of the present character of the land. See City of Long Beach
v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 486-487 (1970). Through this
easement, the State has an overriding power to enter upon
the property and possess it, to make physical changes in the
property, and to control howjh_e pr.o__pertr is used. See
Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-260 (1971); Pe ople v.
California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596-599 (1913). Although
the landowner retains legal title to the property, he controls
little more than the naked fee, for any proposed private use
remains subject to the right of the State or any member of
the public to assert the State's public trust easement. See
Marks v. Whitney, supra.
The question we face is whether a property interest so sub- 1
stantially in derogation of the fee interest patented to petitioner s predecessors can survive t e patent proceedings conducted ursuant to the statuteT mplementing the Treaty of
Gua alupe Hi algo.
e~
t. The federal government, of course, cannot dispose of a right possessed by
the State under the equal footing doctrine of the United
States Constitution. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212
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(1845). Thus, an ordinary federal patent purporting to convey tidelands located within a state to a private individual is
invalid, since the United States holds such tidelands only in
trust for the state. Borax Co. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10,
15-16 (1935). But the Court in Borax recognized that a different result would follow if the private lands had been patented under the 1851 Act. Id., at 19. Patents confirmed
under the authority of the 1851 Act were issued "pursuant to
the authority reserved to the United States to enable it to
discharge its international duty with respect to land which,
although tidelands, had not passed to the State." Id., at 21.
See also State Land Board v. Corvalis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U. S. 363, 375 (1977); Knight v. United States Land
Assn., 142 U. S. 161 (1891).
This fundamental distinction refle ts
/
of the 1851 ct enacted by Con ess.
was mten e o implement this country's obligations under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the 1851 Act also served an
overriding purpose of providing repose to land titles that
originated with Mexican grants. As the Court noted in
Peralta v. United States, 3 Wall. 434 (1865), the territory in
California was undergoing a period of rapid development and
exploitation, primarily as a result of the finding of gold at
Sutter's Mill in 1848. See generally J. Caughey, California
238-255 (1953). It was essential to determine which lands
were private property and which lands were in the public domain in order that interested parties could determine what
land was available from the government. The 1851 Act was
intended "to place the titles to land in California upon a stable
foundation, and to give the parties who possess them an
opportunity of placing them on the records of this country, in
a manner and form that will prevent future controversy."
Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 542, 553-554 (1854); accord, Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming Co., 180 U. S. 72,
77 (1901).
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California argues that since its public trust servitude is a
sovereign right, the interest did not have to be reserved expressly on the federal patent to survive the confirmation proceedings. 4 Patents issued pursuant to the 1851 Act were, of
course, confirmatory patents that did not expand the title of
• In support of this argument the State cites to Montana v. United
States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), and Illinois Central R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S.
387 (1892), in support of its proposition that its public trust servitude survived the 1851 Act confirmation proceedings. While Montana v. United
States and Illinois Central R. v. Illinois support the proposition that alienation of the beds of navigable waters will not be lightly inferred, property
underlying navigable waters can be conveyed in recognition of an "international duty." Montana v. United States, su-pra, 450 U. S. at 552.
Whether the Ballona Lagoon was navigable under federal law in 1850 is
open to speculation. The trial court found only that the present-day lagoon was navigable, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-52, while respondent Los Angeles concedes that the lagoon was not navigable in 1850, Brief of Respondent Los Angeles 29. The obligation of the United States to respect the
property rights of Mexican citizens was, of course, just such an international obligation, made express by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
inherent in the law of nations, see United States v. Moreno, l Wall. 400,
404 (1863); United States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 448 (1858).
The State also argues that the Court has previously recognized that sovereign interests need not be asserted during proceedings confirming private titles. The State's reliance on New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet.
662 (1836), and Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452 (1892), in support of
its argument is misplaced, however. Neither of these cases involved titles
confirmed under the 1851 Act. In New Orleans v. United States, for example, the board of comissioners in that case could only make recommendations to Congress, in contrast to the binding effect of a decree issued by the
Board under the 1851 Act. Thus, we held in that case that the City of
New Orleans could assert public rights over riverfront property which
were previously rejected by the board of commissioners. New Orleans v.
United States, 10 Pet., at 733-734. The decision in Eldridge v. Trezevant,
su-pra, did not even involve a·confirmatory patent, but simply the question
whether an outright federal grant was exempt from long-standing local law
permitting construction of a levee on private property for public safety
purposes. While the Court held that the federal patent did not extinguish the servitude, the interest asserted in that case was not a "right of
permanent occupancy," Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481, 491 (1901), such
as that asserted by the State in this case.
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the original Mexican grantee. Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478
(1865). But our decisions in a line of cases beginning with
Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481 (1901), effectively dispose of
California's claim that it did not have to assert its interest
during the confirmation proceedings. In Barker the Court
was presented with a claim brought on behalf of certain Mission Indians for a permanent right of occupancy on property
derived from grants from Mexico. The Indians' claim to a
right of occupancy was derived from a reservation placed on
the original Mexican grants permitting the grantees to fence
in the property without "interfering with the roads, crossroads, and other usages." Id., at 494, 495. The Court rejected the Indians' claim, holding that:
"If these Indians had any claims founded on the action of
the Mexican Government they abandonded them by not
presenting them to the Commission for consideration,
and ,they could not, therefore, . . . 'resist successfully
any action of the government in disposing of the property.' If it be said that the Indians do not claim the fee,
but only the right of occupation, and therefore, they do
not come within the provision of § 8 as persons 'claiming
lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived
from the Spanish or Mexican Government,' it may be replied that a claim of a right to a permanent occupancy of
land is one of far-reaching effect, and it could not well be
said that the lands burdened with a right of permanent
occupancy were part of the public domain and subject to
the full disposal of the United States. . . . Surely a
claimant would have little reason for presenting to the
Land Commission his claim to land, and securing a confirmation of that claim, if the only result was to transfer
the naked fee to him, burdened by an Indian right of permanent occupancy." Id. at 491-492 (quoting Beard v.
Federy, 3 Wall. 478, 493 (1865)).
The Court followed its holding in Barker in a subsequent
case presenting a similar question, in which the Indians

j
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claimed an aboriginal right of occupancy derived from Spanish and Mexican law that could only be extingui~hed by some
affirmative act of the sovereign. United States v. Title Ins.
& Trust Co., 265 U. S. 472 (1924). Although it was suggested to the Court that Mexican law recognized such an aboriginal right, Brief for Appellant in United States v. Title
Ins. & Trust Co., 0. T. 1923, No. 358, p. 14-16, cf. Chouteau
v. Molony, 16 How. 203, 229 (1853), the Court applied its decision in Barker to hold that because the Indians failed to assert their interest within the timespan established by the
1851 Act, their claimed right of occupancy was barred. The
Court declined an invitation to overrule its decision in Barker
because of the adverse effect of such a decision on land titles,
a result that counseled adherence to a settled interpretation.
Id., at 486.
Finally, in United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U. S.
472 (1921), the government argued that even if the landowner held title to the tidelands by reason of the Mexican
grant, a condemnation award should be reduced to reflect the
servitude of the federal and state governments to protect
navigation, commerce, and fisheries, an interest that the government asserted was paramount to the company's fee interest. The Court expressly rejected the government's argument, holding that the patent proceedings were conclusive as
against the United States in its sovereign capacity, 255
U. S., at 488, and could not be collaterally attacked by the
government. The necessary result of the Coronado Beach
decision is that sovereign claims such as those raised by the
United States in Coronado Beach on its own behalf or on behalf of the State must likewise be asserted in the condemnation proceedings or be barred.
These decisions control the outcome of this case. We hold
that Califorrua cannot at tliis a
a ass
s public trust
easement over petitioner's property, when petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest had their interest confirmed without
any mention of such an easement in proceedings take~u-

/' ) . ~ jJ. ,. ._
~

I
\

82-708---OPINION
SUMMA CORP. v. CALIFORNIA

EX REL.

LANDS COMM'N

11

ant to the Act of 1851. The interest claimed by California is
one of such substantial magnitude that regardless of the fact
that the claim is asserted by the State in its sovereign capacity, this interest, like the Indian claims made in Barker and in
United States v. Title Insurance Co., must have been presented in the patent proceeding or be barred. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed,
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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